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Digital watermarks allow the invisible and indelible
incorporation of information in an item of intellectual
property, such as a digital picture or a digital movie.
Digital watermarks can be used for the detection of
copyright infringement. This article considers one
particular application of digital watermarks: tracing
the source of an illegal distribution. The evidential
value of digital watermarks is considered. The article
identifies areas of concern with respect to the
legality of proof and with respect to the scientific
aspects of proof by digital watermark. The article
concludes with a few wider considerations
concerning the use of digital watermarks for the
purposes of enforcing intellectual property rights.
Introduction 
A digital watermark is meta- information that can be
added to a work such as a picture or a movie. The
watermark is imperceptible to the user of the work
and is difficult to alter or remove. Digital
watermarking technology can be used for a range of
legal applications, including copyright protection. In
this context, the technology could be put to a number
of uses, such as watermarks that identify the author
or rights holder, or watermarks that carry information
identifying the work, which could be used by playing
devices, or by Internet Service Providers (ISP) for the
purpose of recognizing copyrighted materials. This
article will not address these applications, but
focuses on a particular application of digital
watermarks, that of tracing the source of an illegal
work. It functions like this: a watermarked work is
given to a limited number of licensees, for example
movie theatres. After a while the work might appear
on the internet without permission of the rights
holder. With the help of the digital watermark in the
internet-copy of the work, it is relatively easy to
retrieve the code that indicates which of the licensees
might be responsible for failing to secure the movie
appropriately. This article investigates whether
information deduced from digital watermarks could
and should be used as evidence in legal proceedings.
In particular, it will focus on the limitations that the
right to privacy and the science underlying digital
watermarks should impose. The focus will be on
Dutch law.
In the following section of this article, the aims and
context of the use of watermarks for copyright
infringement protection purposes is explained. The
third section analyses the legal issues arising when
using watermarks for evidentiary purposes. Issues
concerning reliability, legality and scientific validity of
digital watermarks will be addressed. The fourth
section analyses how contract law can be used to
diminish the evidentiary risks associated with the use
of watermarks and the limitations that watermarks
impose in this context. Finally, the wider implications
of the use of digital watermarks will be addressed,
both for users of watermarked works, and for the
enforcement of copyright.
The context of copyright infringement
protection 
Although the use of digital watermarks for copyright
infringement protection purposes may take place in
many different contexts, one such context – the movie
industry – will be described here to set the scene for
understanding watermarking as a means for copyright
infringement protection. The movie industry has an
elaborate business model for bringing movies to the
market and to increase the revenue that a movie
yields. Although the exact business model may differ
from production company to production company and
even between movies, a typical business model is
provided. A new movie is first circulated among a
number of reviewers who write comments on the
movie and publish them in widely read periodicals
and internet sites. The production companies hope
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that these reviews whet the appetite of the public to
go and see the movie. When the movie is released to
the public at large this is done exclusively in the
profitable market of the movie theatres. The movie is
later released on DVD for the rental market, such as
hotels or airline companies. When this market is
saturated, the movie is licensed for broadcasting on
television or the internet. The business model is
disturbed if pirated copies of a movie appear on the
internet, especially if it happens in the earlier stages
of the exploitation of the movie. Therefore, most
production companies take measures against pirated
movies appearing on the internet. The traditional
response is to take action against the person that
placed the content on the internet or the ISP that
hosts the movie file. Typically, enforcement focuses on
the links in the illegal distribution chain. It may,
however, be more efficient to try and prevent the
illegal distribution at the source, such as the reviewer
who leaked the movie to the internet or the movie
theatre that may not have done enough to stop
members of the public from recording the movie in the
theatre. In general, the source is the person or entity
within the limited circle that rightfully has a copy at
its disposal and whose copy somehow finds its way to
an illegitimate distribution channel.
One reason for the rights holder to identify the
source is to enable him to investigate whether the
licensee has done enough to prevent the work from
being distributed without authority. If the security
measures in place are not sufficient, the rights holder
may be able to take measures to prevent a leak from
occurring again, such as future exclusion of the
licensee or requiring the licensee to implement
improved measures against leaks. The rights holder
may also want to recoup damages from the licensee.
The behaviour of the licensee may also constitute
indirect copyright infringement or breach of contract.
It might be that the licensee or their employee
engaged in criminal behaviour, such as aiding and
abetting copyright infringement. The rights holder
may also want to pursue any legal remedies in this
respect.
The traditional way of identifying the source of the
illegal version of the copyrighted material is to
identify the person who placed a work on the internet,
and request a court to order the defendant or the
person suspected of uploading the infringing work to
make known his predecessor from which he obtained
the infringing materials (compare article 1019f Dutch
Code of Civil Procedure ‘DCCivP’).2 This process can
be a burden, because it might take some time before
the rights holder identifies the person responsible for
the breach.
Digital watermarking provides an easier way to
identify the source of the breach. Upon distribution,
each copy is digitally watermarked with a copyright
infringement protection code. Each licensee obtains a
copy with a unique watermark that identifies him as
the licensee. In this way, it is possible to detect the
relevant licensee quickly, once a pirated and
watermarked copy has been discovered on the
internet. Identification of the licensee by
watermarking fulfills a pressing need, especially if
other methods of identification, such as following the
links of the chain, are impossible or uneconomical.
Mere identification of the licensee is one step. If
measures are to be taken against the licensee and the
licensee is not willing to comply, it is relevant to know
whether the detection by watermark provides
adequate evidence of the identity of the licensee.
Although a degree of certainty about the identity of
the registered licensee does not indicate what role, if
any, he or she played in failing to control the
intellectual property, it is an important first step in
building a case to take further measures. Either the
watermark and the infrastructure in which it is
included provide direct legal proof of the identity of
the licensee, or based on the detection of the
watermark, further legal measures can be taken to
arrive at a proof of the identity of the licensee. An
example of the latter is the preliminary witness
2 Article 1019f DCCivP is the Dutch implementation
of article 8 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on
the enforcement of intellectual property rights OJ L
157, 30.4.2004 and OJ L 195, 02/06/2004 p. 16 –
25: Right of information 1. Member States shall
ensure that, in the context of proceedings
concerning an infringement of an intellectual
property right and in response to a justified and
proportionate request of the claimant, the
competent judicial authorities may order that
information on the origin and distribution
networks of the goods or services which infringe
an intellectual property right be provided by the
infringer and/or any other person who: (a) was
found in possession of the infringing goods on a
commercial scale; (b) was found to be using the
infringing services on a commercial scale; (c) was
found to be providing on a commercial scale
services used in infringing activities; or (d) was
indicated by the person referred to in point (a), (b)
or (c) as being involved in the production,
manufacture or distribution of the goods or the
provision of the services. 2. The information
referred to in paragraph 1 shall, as appropriate,
comprise: (a) the names and addresses of the
producers, manufacturers, distributors, suppliers
and other previous holders of the goods or
services, as well as the intended wholesalers and
retailers; (b) information on the quantities
produced, manufactured, delivered, received or
ordered, as well as the price obtained for the
goods or services in question. 3. Paragraphs 1 and
2 shall apply without prejudice to other statutory
provisions which: (a) grant the rightholder rights
to receive fuller information; (b) govern the use in
civil or criminal proceedings of the information
communicated pursuant to this Article; (c) govern
responsibility for misuse of the right of
information; or (d) afford an opportunity for
refusing to provide information which would force
the person referred to in paragraph 1 to admit to
his/her own participation or that of his/her close
relatives in an infringement of an intellectual
property right; or (e) govern the protection of
confidentiality of information sources or the
processing of personal data.
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3 For an additional discussion on Dutch law relating
to electronic evidence, see Dr. Simone van der Hof,
Réno Pijnen and Simone Fennell-van Esch, ‘The
Netherlands’ in Stephen Mason, general editor,
International Electronic Evidence (British Institute
of International and Comparative Law, 2008).
statement (article 186 DCivCP),3 that is the possibility
to summon and hear witnesses before the actual
proceedings have started. A rights holder may thus
summon the identified licensee to provide witness
evidence about the circumstances under which the
watermarked intellectual property was copied to the
internet.
In general, the standard of proof required for
evidence in relation to such preliminary measures is
low, and the quality of information derived from
watermarks is generally adequate for such purposes.
Nevertheless, there may be other circumstances that
make the indirect route less attractive or even
impossible. For example, the witness may deny any
involvement or claim to have no recollection of the
relevant circumstances. In criminal law, the
authorities can use investigatory powers to obtain
further evidence, but the use of many of these powers
requires a suspicion of committing a criminal offence.
Identification by watermark may be sufficient to found
a suspicion of, for example, aiding and abetting
copyright infringement. However, most powers can
only be used if there is a suspicion of a criminal
offence that is punishable with a prison sentence of at
least four years (article 67 Dutch Code of Criminal
Procedure ‘DCCrimP’). This holds for example for the
most useful power of claiming stored data
(article126nd DCCrimP) that may, for example, be
exercised against an ISP or a hotel. However,
intentional copyright infringement is only punishable
with a prison sentence of up to 6 months (article 31
Dutch Copyright Act ‘DCA’) and thus falls well short of
the condition. Only if copyright infringement is
committed in a professional or business capacity it is
punishable with a prison sentence of up to four years
(article 31b DCA). However, aiding and abetting such
copyright infringement would then again fall under
the four year threshold: it is punishable with up to 2
years and 8 months imprisonment (article 49 Dutch
Criminal Code ‘DCC’). This means the police have
limited powers to investigate further on the basis of
detection by watermark.
In conclusion, information derived from watermarks
is generally adequate to obtain further evidence. In
practice however, other circumstances may prevent
the rights holder from taking further measures.
Therefore, it is worthwhile to investigate the potential
that watermarks themselves have as a direct means 
of evidence.
Proof by digital watermark 
The preceding section raises the question whether,
and if so under what conditions, the identity of the
licensee can be proven directly with the help of digital
watermarks. The rules of evidence differ between civil
and criminal cases.
Formal means and assessment of evidence 
The Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure has a closed
system of formal means of evidence. If the results of
the detection and further investigation of a watermark
are laid down in a document, the document can be
part of the proof as a ‘geschreven bescheid’ (a written
document). The probatory value is to be decided by
the court. The Dutch Code of Civil Procedure permits
evidence to be provided by any means (article 152.1
DCCivP). There is no closed system of formal means of
evidence. A court determines for itself what value it
attaches to a watermark as a means of evidence
(article 152.2 DCCivP). Evidence by digital watermark
is basically possible in the Netherlands. Any evidence
that can shed light on the probanda may be adduced
in court. However, the court is free to evaluate
evidence of the watermark. Naturally, a defendant can
contest the evidence that the claimant deduces from a
digital watermark.
Disputing evidence
A defendant can challenge the watermark in three
ways: (i) he may contend that the evidence is
unreliable, that is it is unfit to prove. This may be, for
instance, because the digital evidence was not
handled correctly; (ii) he may have legal objections
against the evidence, for instance where the evidence
is gathered or presented in an unlawful way; or (iii) he
may question the scientific validity of the evidence.
These categories are not mutually exclusive. Evidence
may be both unreliable and unlawful. The third
category could be said to be an instance of the first
category. It is dealt with separately here because of
its particular character.
Reliability of the evidence
The reliability of the evidence may be challenged in
various ways. Examples include:
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1. Whether the item in question was actually found
on the internet.
2. The entire process of affixing, registering and
detecting digital watermarks was not executed
with the required care and attention and therefore
the watermark is unreliable as evidence.
3. The integrity of the database containing the
registrations of affixed watermarks is
compromised so that the mapping from
‘watermark’ to identity has become unreliable (for
instance as a consequence of criminals hacking
into the database).
4. A licensee did not enrol under his own name.
Hence, the data in the watermark is not
necessarily sufficient to establish his or her
identity.
Whether these contentions are successful depends on
the extent to which the defendant can corroborate
them with additional facts. The contentions can
largely be preempted if the rights holder takes
adequate measures beforehand. Such measures can
include a combination of technical (firewall and virus
protection of the database), procedural (identity
checks at enrollment, procedures for registration of
what picture was found where, when and by whom,
safe storage of retrieved pictures, watermark
detection in a safe environment, providing for
possibilities for contra-examination) and institutional
measures (outsourcing watermarking and detection to
a third party). Where doubts continue to be raised
with respect to the reliability of the evidence, even
where it is proved that the rights holder took such
measures, it will be for the court to decide whether it
shares the doubts and if so, whether they make the
evidence unusable. When rendering its decision, a
court will look critically at the credibility of the doubts
in view of the measures taken to safeguard the
reliability of the evidence. In any event, the court is
free to assess the evidence before it and to attach the
value to it that it sees fit. The party relying on the
watermark may try to reach an agreement with the
licensee about the evidence in order to deal with any
uncertainty relating to the court’s discretion to assess
the evidence. Such an agreement can resolve many of
the uncertainties that exist under the statutory law of
evidence. Agreements about evidence only affect the
parties privy to the agreement and only in civil
proceedings. These agreements will be dealt with below.
Legality of the evidence
The legality of the evidence can be disputed in 
various ways:
1. The evidence was obtained using a covert means
(possibly) infringing human rights such as privacy.
2. Personal identifying information was registered
at a moment that no suspicion of infringement
existed, thus infringing privacy or data 
protection rules.
3. The combination of watermarking, registration
and detection gave insight to patterns of
communication or information such that it
impinged upon the unencumbered exercise of the
freedom of expression as meant in article 10
ECHR. Basically, it is contended that the evidence
was gathered or presented in an unlawful way
and that this unlawfulness should be a reason to
apply the exclusionary rule, that is to disallow 
the evidence.
Two questions arise. First, it is necessary to know the
conditions by which evidence was unlawfully
obtained. Second, if evidence was obtained
unlawfully, whether it should it be excluded.
With respect to whether the evidence can lawfully
be admitted, criminal and civil law differ. In criminal
law, the gathering and presentation of evidence is
subject to the legality principle: the police and judicial
authorities may only exercise powers that infringe
upon human rights if they have been statutorily
granted to them.4 In defining the powers and the
conditions under which they may be used, the
legislator balances the benefits of exercising the
power against the infringement of human rights such
as privacy. Evidence gathered without an adequate
legal basis infringes privacy and is basically unlawful.
Other reasons for excluding evidence in criminal
proceedings may be that, where there is a statutory
power, the required formalities have not been
4 In the Netherlands: Enquêtecommissie
opsporingsmethoden (colloquially known as the
van Traa Commission) Inzake Opsporing, 1996,
available at: http://www.burojansen.nl/
traa/index.htm.  
DIGITAL WATERMARKS AS LEGAL EVIDENCE
155© Pario Communications Limited, 2011 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, Vol 8
156 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, Vol 8 © Pario Communications Limited, 2011
5 For JPRG 2000 this has been standardised in JPSEC
2000 Security (Part 8 – JPSEC), ISO/IEC 15444-
8:2007.
complied with or even if the formalities have been
complied with, the exercise of the power may be
disproportionate, in that no reasonable relation may
exist between the costs of the exercise of the power
and the purpose that is to be attained by it.
In civil law, the parties to the action gather the
evidence. The gathering of evidence may not breach
statutory rules, may not infringe upon subjective
rights or may not lack due care. Providing evidence
has been obtained lawfully, all methods may be used
to collect evidence.
The actions of private persons are not governed by
the legality principle. If watermark based evidence
gathered by civilians is later used in criminal
proceedings against an infringer, the gathering of
evidence is mostly judged against civil standards. This
does not hold if the police actively solicit the
gathering of civil evidence in order to evade the
constraints of public law. The use of digital
watermarks for the purpose of enforcing intellectual
property rights will mainly be used in a civilian
setting. To the author’s knowledge, there are no
public policy documents in which watermarking is
seen as a task for government. The failure to gather
evidence lawfully is dealt with according to civil
standards. If publicly funded institutions such as
museums or archives use watermarking, they are not
subject to the legality principle. This is not seen as
exercising a typically public function, but merely as
enforcement of their civil interests.
In practice, a breach of privacy is the most prevalent
reason for the evidence to be refused admission into
proceedings. For this reason, the discussion is
restricted to whether watermarks could infringe
privacy. The privacy implications are dependent upon
the way in which copyright infringement protection is
implemented using watermarks.
As a preliminary issue, it is relevant to know who or
what is being registered as a licensee. A watermark
may refer to a legal entity, such as distribution
companies, or to individuals. In the former case, the
identifying details of the company are registered. It is
assumed that this does not raise a privacy problem. In
case individuals (such as reviewers) are being
registered, the question of privacy is self-evidently
relevant.
For the purposes of analysis in relation to privacy, it
is important to discern four stages of the watermark
process:
1. Affixing the watermark to the intellectual property.
This is the necessary preparatory act required to
make it possible to trace the person responsible
for breaching copyright later on in the process.
2. The presence of the watermark in the intellectual
property. At this stage, it is relevant that people
without authority do not obtain access to the data
in the watermark. In essence, there are two
options in respect of the information to be
included in the watermark: the watermark
comprises data that directly identifies a person or
legal entity, such as name, address and dwelling
place are placed in the watermark, or an
indentifying code is inserted that in itself carries
no information about the registered licensee. The
first option requires the watermark to be
encrypted in order to prevent unauthorized access
to the information it contains. It is possible to
encrypt the watermark only, while the rest of the
picture is not encrypted.5 The latter option
requires the user of the watermark to maintain a
database that enables the code to correspond to
a physical identity. It is necessary for the
database to be secured against unauthorized
access.
3. Reading the watermark. This is relevant because it
If watermark based evidence gathered by
civilians is later used in criminal proceedings
against an infringer, the gathering of evidence
is mostly judged against civil standards
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creates a relationship between the person or legal
entity recorded in the watermark and the
appearance of the work in a place where it should
not be. The watermark can be read by the content
provider, rights holder, or by a third party.
4. The use of the results of reading the watermark.
The data from the watermark taken together with
the facts of the circumstances in which the
intellectual property is found, will give rise to
information that can be used to take appropriate
action by the rights holder, if it is deemed
necessary.
A privacy analysis cannot focus on a single stage in
isolation, but must assess the process as a whole.
When taking data protection as the starting point of
the analysis, the following picture may arise. Article 8
subparagraph f of the Dutch Data Protection Act
(DDPA) provides that processing is justified as
follows:
‘Art. 8 WBP: Persoonsgegevens mogen slechts
worden verwerkt indien: [ … ] f. de
gegevensverwerking noodzakelijk is voor de
behartiging van het gerechtvaardigde belang van de
verantwoordelijke of van een derde aan wie de
gegevens worden verstrekt, tenzij het belang of de
fundamentele rechten en vrijheden van de
betrokkene, in het bijzonder het recht op
bescherming van de persoonlijke levenssfeer,
prevaleert.’
‘where it is necessary for the purposes of the
legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by
the third party or parties to whom the data are
disclosed, except where such interests are
overridden by the interests for fundamental rights
and freedoms of the registered licensee.’
It is necessary to ascertain what legitimate interest
the user of the watermark has in using a watermark
and whether the process meets the requirements of
effectiveness, proportionality and subsidiarity.
The first step is straightforward. A copyright owner
has a legitimate interest in enforcing his copyright,
and digital watermarks are a technology that is
helpful in this respect. The second step is more
elaborate and must take into account the different
choices that can be made when implementing a
watermarking scheme.
The effectiveness of watermarking can be made
plausible as follows: it is usually more effective to
deal with enforcement at the point at which it occurs,
that is by closing down a source of copyrighted
material, rather than prosecuting all those who place
a work on-line. In copyright cases, it is not unusual to
require an infringing party to reveal the source of the
infringing materials. Watermarks used for copyright
infringement protection purposes are the ideal means
to quickly identify a source, and are helpful in
enforcing copyright. Effectiveness does not appear to
be too large a hurdle to overcome.
Proportionality poses a more significant challenge.
One issue is whether watermarks are a reasonable
means to an end. Watermarks affect the privacy of the
registered licensee. The information that can be
derived from a watermark and the circumstances in
which the intellectual property is found can be used
to draw conclusions about the registered licensee and
help the drawer of the conclusions to decide how to
approach or treat the registered licensee. The
presence of the watermark provides no information
about the way in which the cover-work leaked to the
internet; neither does it give information about the
role of the registered licensee, if any. Hence, the
privacy interests of the licensee make it necessary to
consider how watermarking is implemented. For the
sake of clarity, this analysis will be structured by
distinguishing the different stages of the
watermarking process.
At the stage of affixing the watermark and handing
the marked item of intellectual property over to the
licensee, it is necessary that the registered licensee
be informed about the presence and contents of the
watermark, especially since it is covertly present in
the work, and he may not have any other way of
knowing that his or her data are being processed
(article 33 DDPA). For the second stage, the period
between affixing and reading, the information that is
actually put into the watermark is relevant. As noted
above, there are two alternative options: first,
including directly identifying information into the
watermark, such as the licensee’s name, address and
dwelling place. Second, an identification code may be
put in the watermark, such as a random number. In
the latter case, the content provider or a trusted third
party retains a database that provides a link between
the identification code to the physical identity, such
as name, address and dwelling place. Although the
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latter implementation is more elaborate, it may have
an advantage in terms of the amount of data included
in the watermark. An identification code is more
compact than a reference to the attributes of a
physical identity, and a shorter watermark is easier to
hide in a picture or other item of intellectual property.
More importantly for data protection purposes, the
consequences differ, depending on the approach
adopted. In the first approach, the licensee becomes
the custodian of his own data. The protection of the
right holder’s copyright and protection of the
licensee’s personal data are brought together. If the
licensee does not share the work for privacy reasons,
the right holder’s copyright is automatically protected.
The licensee must obviously be informed of the exact
data present in the watermark; since the watermark is
imperceptible he cannot see so for himself. With this
knowledge, he can take adequate measures to protect
the data against unauthorized access. Furthermore, it
enables him to exercise his right to correct the data,
should the data prove to be wrong. From a data
protection perspective, this alternative seems to be
straight forward. The second option is more
complicated from a data protection perspective. Here,
the content provider or a third party is responsible for
the personal data, and will have to take the measures
necessary to protect the data against unauthorized
access.
In the third stage, who reads the watermark is
relevant: the user of the watermark or a trusted third
party (TTP). In the latter case, extra care towards the
registered licensee can be built into the process by
stipulating the conditions under which the TTP may
provide data to the user of the watermark. A possible
condition could be that the user of the watermark can
obtain access to the data where a registered licensee
is involved in more than one breach of the licence. In
the absence of a TTP, the care due to the registered
licensee may be implemented in another way, such as
by formulating conditions for the use of the data.
Finally, in the fourth stage, the use of the data could
be regulated by self-imposed rules. In this instance, it
is important to know that the data are being used for
a purpose for which they are fit. The risk of
misinterpretation is significant. The item of
intellectual property may have been revealed on the
internet by somebody other than the registered
licensee. The item of intellectual property may even
have left the possession of the rightful licensee
involuntarily, perhaps because his computer was
hacked. Any conclusions about the involvement of the
registered licensee in a disclosure of the intellectual
property have to be dealt with the utmost care and
attention. Subsequent actions towards the registered
licensee should be based on adequate information
about the evidence, partly derived from the
watermark, but preferably supported by information
from other sources.
Finally, watermarking should pass the subsidiarity
test. It will be necessary to establish whether there
are other, less burdensome means to trace the source
from which infringing materials originate. The existing
alternative mentioned above is to obtain court orders
obliging infringing parties to disclose the identity of
person from whom they obtained the work, thus
advancing one link in the chain and to repeat this until
the first source in the distribution chain has been
reached. This method is particularly onerous, not just
for the user of the watermarks, but also for all
intermediate links in the illegal distribution chain. In
the traditional way, each person and the relationship
between each person must be identified. Digital
watermarks bypass all the intermediate links and only
implicate the privacy of the source. In this respect,
digital watermarks are a very useful method of
identifying a licensee.
In conclusion, data protection legislation does not
prevent the use of watermarks. It is necessary to
provide guarantees to protect the interest of the
registered licensee at each stage of the watermarking
process. The extent to which the user of a watermark
has to go to protect the interests of registered
licensees depends on the particular circumstances of
the watermarking application, such as the value of the
works, the efficiency of reducing the ability of the
licensee to deal with the intellectual property other
than in accordance with the terms of the licence, the
consequences attached to positive identification and
the nature of the information revealed about the
source through positive identification.
It might be that the legitimate interest of the
controller does not justify the processing of the data
of licensees. This means another justification to
process data must be considered. Of the justifications
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mentioned in article 8 DDPA, consent is the most
promising. When the registered licensee consents to
their data being viewed, processing the data can be
justified, but the DDPA is careful to regulate how
consent should be obtained. The consent should be
given in such a way that any doubt that the controller
may have about the consent is excluded. If there is
any doubt, the controller is obliged to verify whether
the registered licensee has actually given their
consent.6 This seems to exclude that consent is
obtained through a provision included in the general
terms and conditions that go with the license. A more
conspicuous mention of the data processing must be
made, such as through a pop-up message when
agreeing to a license. Sufficient information about
what the registered licensee agrees to must also be
made available. Another concern with respect to
consent is that the party using the watermark will
need to be able to prove the consent. This means that
the necessary legal, technical and organizational
measures must be taken to safeguard this.
Many privacy issues can be avoided if watermarks
are used to register companies or institutions rather
than individual persons. Assuming that the companies
are so large and the other circumstances are such that
spontaneous recognition of individual persons can be
excluded, data protection problems may not be
relevant. An example may be the case where a hotel is
registered in a watermark database instead of
individual hotel guests, or where a movie theater is
registered instead of individual visitors.
Exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence 
If it is not possible to prove consent, or the notice of
registration of personal data was inadequate, or
privacy is infringed in some other way, the evidence is
considered to be unlawfully obtained, even though
the evidence may be perfectly reliable. Where
evidence has been improperly obtained, it is useful to
consider whether the evidence should be excluded, or
whether it can be admitted. If the evidence is
admitted, perhaps the unlawfulness can be dealt with
in another way.7 Dutch civil courts have hitherto been
reticent in excluding unlawfully obtained but reliable
evidence.8 However, if watermarks are being used
systematically, privacy infringement may have a
structural character. Every work released with a
watermark may be infringing privacy. In such cases, a
court may be more inclined to set an example by
excluding unlawful evidence. In such circumstances, it
is not just a single case, but the general practice by
the user of the watermark that is at issue. At the time
of writing, two criminal cases in the court of Haarlem
have excluded evidence that the Dutch security
services obtained through illegal interception of the
telephone of a journalist.9 This indicates that the
possibility of applying the exclusionary rule is far from
purely theoretical. Another implication of privacy
infringements may be that the privacy commissioner,
in the Netherlands the ‘College Bescherming
Persoonsgegevens’, steps in and forbids the further
use of watermarks until such time as the privacy
concerns are adequately addressed. This is, however,
outside the realm of the law of evidence and will not
be dealt with here.
Scientific disputation 
A scientific disputation of the evidence may take the
following forms:
False positives 
A defendant could claim that detection software has
found a watermark in a picture that was never put into
it. Perhaps no watermark was ever placed in the
picture, perhaps another watermark had been placed
in it. That this could occur by coincidence, for example
as a consequence of compression, resizing or other
normal processing acts, is very unlikely. The length of
a watermark is so great that the chance that random
changes in bits would produce something that could
be recognized as a watermark is statistically
negligible. False positives through human
intervention such as collusion are more likely.
Collusion could work as follows. Suppose two
licensees have the same picture, but each has a
different watermark. Then the licensees could, by
comparing the two pictures, discover the bytes
making up the watermark by finding out where the
bytes that make up their pictures differ. They could
6 C. M. K. C. Cuijpers, C. W. J. Ebbers, A. C. M. de
Heij, P. J. D. J. Muijen and J. E.J. Prins
(eds.),Voorschriften Privacybescherming, The
Hague: Elsevier Overheid 1980, A 4.2-Wbp-article
8-4.
7 Compare J. B. H. M. Simmelink, ‘Bewijsrecht en
bewijswaardering’, in: M. S. Groenhuijsen and G.
Knigge, Het onderzoek ter zitting: Eerste
interimrapport onderzoeksproject Strafvordering
2001, (Gouda Quint, 2001) p 423 for the Belgian
law. Article 154, 189 and 211 BCCrimP: ‘regularly
obtained’ means that the evidence is obtained
through honest means and without deception. If
that is not the case then the evidence must be
excluded.
8 M. Kremer, Onrechtmatig verkregen bewijs in
civiele zaken (PhD research Groningen), Deventer:
W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink 1999.
9 District Court of Haarlem 14 July 2010, LJN: BN1195,
15/700461-09 and District Court of Haarlem 14 July
2010, LJN: BN1191, 15/700462-09.
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10 This type of problem has been investigated by 
Dieter Bardyn, Ann Dooms, Tim Dams and Peter
Schelkens, Comparative Study of Wavelet Based
Lattice QIM Techniques and Robustness against
AWGN and JPEG Attacks, Proceedings of the 8th
International Workshop on Digital Watermarking,
(Springer-Verlag Berlin, Heidelberg, 2009) pp 
39-53.
11 Rechtbank Rotterdam 27-04-2005, LJN: AT4777,
10/010049-04 and Gerechtshof ’s-Gravenhage 22-
11-2005, LJN: AU6566, 2200301205.
12 Jong-Nam Kim and Byung-Ha Ahn, MPEG
Standards and Watermarking Technologies, in
Juergen Seitz, editor, Digital watermarking for
digital media, (IGI Publishing, 2005), pp 182-214.
13 HR 27 January 1998, NJ, 404. Dossier no. 106416.
This decision of the Dutch Supreme Court is not
yet available from a free digital open source,
although it has been assigned a reference
number (ZD0917) in the free on-line case law
collection ‘rechtspraak.nl’.
then make up a third copy of the picture that is in
every respect the same as the two copies they already
have, apart from the bytes that make up the
watermark. If they give the bytes the average value of
the byte values found in their original pictures,
something could be created that might be recognized
as a watermark. This means that the watermarking
algorithm must make sure that no watermark is given
out that is capable of being an ‘average’ of any two
other watermarks that have been given out. When the
number of watermarks in circulation is limited, this
can easily be done, but when the number of
watermarked copies of the picture becomes larger
this becomes increasingly difficult.
Partial retrieval 
By the time an item of intellectual property is
retrieved from the internet, its watermark may have
been damaged. It may be that the watermark can only
be partially read.10 The problem shows some
semblance with the use of DNA for identification
purposes. Sometimes DNA found at crime scene has
deteriorated, so that only a partial profile can be
derived from it. This has not given rise to a question
of interpretation, because a forensic scientist can
explain what it statically means: that, for instance
less Short Tandem Repeats (STR) are used. In other
words, they can indicate the level of reliability of their
findings. What has given rise to discussion is how to
report partial DNA findings. In the past, a profile that
was so incomplete as to be useless for positive
identification purposes was not reported at all by the
forensic scientist.11 Later, it proved to be important
that the court should be made aware of the presence
of the deteriorated DNA, since it pointed to the
presence of somebody else other than the suspect; it
may not have been fit for a positive identification, but
it could still be used for the purpose of excluding the
suspect. This raises the question how digital evidence
specialists should report about partially retrieved
watermarks. The problem with digital watermarks is
even more complicated because there are many
algorithms and applications available for
watermarking. A watermark embedded by one
company can usually not be detected by software of
another company.12 This means it may even be more
difficult to determine whether there are any partial
watermarks that may be present in addition to the
one a digital evidence specialist may have been asked
to identify.
Authenticity of the watermark 
The watermark may be a fabrication after the fact.
Given a picture, theoretically a watermarking
algorithm and key could be made that reads any code
from the item of intellectual property. For this reason,
it is especially important that the watermarking
techniques used are registered with a trusted third
party before handing out watermarked intellectual
property, or at least well before any conflict about the
watermark arises. Only by fixing the algorithm and
key before the event, can it be proven that a
watermark found in intellectual property was actually
placed in the work before the dispute arose. The key
in this respect has the function of coding where the
watermark is located in the intellectual property. It
must thus be distinguished from a possible key used
for encrypting the message contained in the
watermark.
Discussion before a court about these issues
involves digital evidence specialists explaining
reports they prepared about an investigation into a
marked item of intellectual property. The
requirements that an expert witness must meet under
Dutch law are very general. In the Netherlands,
scientific expert evidence should conform to the
criteria set out in the Schoenmaker case:13
1. What is the profession, the education and
experience of the expert?
2. Does the expertise relate to the subject on which
the expert is giving an opinion?
3. What method did the expert use?
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4. What is the reliability (validity) of the method
used?
5. Was the expert able to apply the method in a
competent fashion?
Of the five criteria, the fourth criterion is the most
significant in respect of digital evidence: the expert
must be able to show that the method he used for
arriving at his conclusions is reliable. As a
consequence of the Schiedam park murder case, the
trend in the Netherlands is to have healthy scepticism
towards the results of investigations and the science
involved in obtaining them.14 It is not enough to show
the findings. If necessary, the court must be able to
verify the steps the expert took for arriving at his
conclusion.
In this respect, it is important that there are
standards that codify the shared opinion in the
scientific community to which digital evidence
specialists can refer in their reports and testimonies.15
In the field of digital watermarking, there have been
several initiatives to arrive at standards, such as in
the context of Copy Protection Technical Working
Group and Digital Audio-Visual Council (DAVIC). The
Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG consortium)
helped to develop a standard that has the greatest
relevance in this respect, a standard about the
evaluation of persistent association technologies.16
This standard is part of the extensive framework of
MPEG 21. Part 11 of the standard does not state a
specific aim for the evaluations it standardizes
because it is not specifically written with forensic
purposes in mind. It should be used by content
providers to select a watermarking technology that
best fits their functional requirements. The standard
indicates a number of best practices for defining a
test configuration and the actual evaluation of digital
watermarks. These best practices should be
implemented in working procedures and benchmark
tools used for evaluation. Examples of such tools are
computer programs such as Stirmark,17 Checkmark,18
Optimark,19 and WET (Watermark Evaluation
Testbed).20 However, the standard leaves many details
about the implementation of an evaluation open. For
instance, it does not prescribe in detail how to
perform an evaluation, nor does it provide boundary
values for the parameters it distinguishes. Such
details can only be given if it is known how the
watermark is applied, because only then the
characteristics of the watermark are known. The
approach of indicating best practices does have the
obvious advantage that the standard is reasonably
independent from the technology and will not easily
become outdated.21 At the same time, this means that
an adequate technical evaluation of, for example, the
authenticity of a watermark retrieved from a picture
found on the internet depends on the quality of the
benchmarking programs used and the experts
involved in performing the evaluation. As indicated
above, it is also not specifically aimed at forensic use.
The parties and courts that need to evaluate
recovered watermarks must therefore be critical about
how the best practices have been implemented. In
this respect, additional work geared towards
standardisation of forensic procedures and
certification of benchmarks and forensic experts or
investigation institutes would provide much needed
help for courts. This does not take way the relevance
of less formal mechanisms such as experts being able
to refer to scientific findings; in fact, in common law
countries these mechanisms carry more weight than
standards and certification.22 
Contracts and evidence 
A court has discretion in assessing the evidentiary
value of a watermark. This causes some uncertainty
as to the extent to which a content provider can rely
on a watermark as a means of evidence. In the license
between the rights holder or distributor and the
14 Rechtbank Rotterdam 27-04-2005, LJN: AT4777,
10/010049-04 and Gerechtshof ’s-Gravenhage 22-
11-2005, LJN: AU6566, 2200301205.
15 For a more detailed discussion, see Stephen
Mason, general editor, Electronic Evidence (2nd
edn, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2010), Chapters 3,
4 and 5, especially section 4.04, p 86.
16 ISO/IEC TR 21000-11:2004 Information technology
-- Multimedia framework (MPEG-21) -- Part 11:
Evaluation Tools for Persistent Association
Technologies.
17 F. A. P. Petitcolas, ‘Watermarking schemes
evaluation’, IEEE Signal Processing, Volume 17,
Issue 5, September 2000, pp 58–64.
18 S. Pereira, S. Voloshynovskiy, M. Madueno, S.
Marchand-Maillet and T. Pun, ‘Second
generation benchmarking and application
oriented evaluation,’ Information Hiding
Workshop III, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, April 2001.
19 V Nikos Nikolaidis, Sofia Tsekeridou, Anastasios
Tefas, Vassilios Solachidis, Athanasios Nikolaidis
and Ioannis Pitas, ‘A benchmarking protocol for
watermarking methods,’ in IEEE International
Conference on Image Processing, volume 3,
October 2001, pp 1023–1026.
20 Hyung Cook Kim, Hakeem Ogunleye, Oriol
Guitart, and Edward J. Delp, ‘The watermark
evaluation testbed (WET),’ in Edward J. Delp III
and Ping W. Wong, editors, Security,
Steganography, and Watermarking of Multimedia
Contents, VI (Proceedings Volume), Proceedings
of SPIE Volume 5306, pp 236-247.
21 See Section 6 ‘Use Cases for Evaluation of
Persistent Association Tools’ of ISO/IEC TR
21000-11:2004 Information technology --
Multimedia framework (MPEG-21) -- Part 11:
Evaluation Tools for Persistent Association
Technologies.
22 Stephen Mason, general editor, Electronic
Evidence, p 86.
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23 W. H. G. A. Filott, Algemene bankvoorwaarden,
Serie Bank- en Effectenrecht nr. 3, Deventer:
Kluwer 2000, pp 70-75, W. J. Slagter, Commentaar
op de Algemene Bankvoorwaarden, NIBE
Bankjuridische reeks nr. 38, Amsterdam:
Nederlands Instituut voor het Bank- en
Effectenbedrijf 1999, pp 120-123.
24 Compare HR 26 April 1996 RvdW 1996, 101c
(Honig/WUH).
licensee, provisions concerning evidence may be
incorporated. Such provisions strengthen the position
of the rights holder or distributor in civil cases
considerably, if the defendant is a contract partner or
licensee. That the person identified by the watermark
is a licensee is probably the default situation since a
watermark is used to identify the ‘buyer’ of a copy of
the work and digital copyrighted works are usually
only distributed under an (End User) License
Agreement (EULA). The rights holder or distributor
may incorporate contractual provisions in the EULA
that indicate what the evidentiary value of digital
watermarks is. The provisions may, for example,
indicate that a watermark provides cogent proof of
certain facts (such as the identity of the licensee)
between the parties. By declaring certain evidence to
be cogent between parties, the discretion of the court
in assessing the evidentiary value of the proof is
removed; the court must accept the evidence as proof.
Provisions in a contract may also bypass the issue of
evidence altogether and directly impose certain
consequences upon positive identification. An
example may be a provision that allows the rights
holder to obtain access to the records of the person
identified by the watermark or even to obtain access
to the buildings in order to check relevant business
procedures (such as those involving measures aimed
at preventing copyright infringement).
An important question is whether such agreements
about evidence are valid. In accordance with the
provisions of article 6:233 DCivC, such an agreement
when included in general conditions can be nullified if
it is unreasonably burdensome for the party subject
to the general conditions. The main question is
whether an agreement declaring watermarks to give
cogent proof is unreasonable. If an agreement does
not allow the licensee to adduce proof of the
opposite, such is the case (article 6:236 sub k DCivC
only applies to business to consumer transactions,
and at best analogously applicable in business to
business transactions). If an agreement allows proof
of the opposite, and only takes away the assessment
discretion from the court (cogent proof ), the
agreement could be allowed. The agreement could
also be unreasonable if the evidence provided by a
digital watermark is unreliable and chances are that
the unreliability is to the detriment of the party
subjected to the general terms. In the context of
contracts between banks and their clients, it is, for
example, stipulated that the administration of the
bank provides cogent proof. When arguing the
acceptability of this provision, the general confidence
that can be placed in banks is mentioned (this
argument is perhaps a little weakened in
contemporary times). It is often observed that banks
are subject to many legal rules regarding their
administration, and that compliance with these rules
is controlled by supervising institutions.23 With
respect to watermarks, there are no legal rules
governing watermarks and supervising institutions.
This does not mean that evidentiary provisions in
contract are invalid because trust in the reliability of
watermarks could be organized in a different way. For
example, standardization and certification could play
an important role in this respect.
A second issue is that a watermark can never prove
more than that a certain copy of a work entered an
illegal distribution channel. It provides no proof that
the person registered as the legitimate holder of that
copy actually introduced the copy into the illegal
distribution network. Additional evidence is necessary
to prove the identity of the person who entered the
copy in the illegal channel. If a provision about cogent
proof is included in a contract and is found to be
acceptable, this does not mean that the content
provider need not prove anything. He still will have to
show that, according to his registration of events, no
irregularities are apparent.24
General implications of proof by
watermark 
The discussion has focused as to whether and if so
under what conditions digital watermarks may be
used for copyright infringement protection purposes
under Dutch law. The wider implications of using
watermarks for copyright infringement protection
purposes have not been addressed. Additional
concerns include how digital watermarks will affect
businesses; whether it will revolutionize copyright
enforcement, and what effect, if any, it will have on
society and individual citizens. The breadth of these
questions precludes that they will be dealt with
exhaustively here. Therefore, some tentative
observations of will be made about the most 
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striking elements.
Evidence based on digital watermarks is part of
copyright enforcement. Enforcement of copyright on
the internet has been a problem for as long as the
internet has been available to the public at large.
However, it seems that the momentum is gathering to
deal with the problem more actively. On the
international level, negotiations about an Anti-
Counterfeit Trade Agreement are well underway. On
the Dutch national level, a parliamentary working
group recommended that the government support
copyright enforcement with new initiatives if right
holders improve the availability of legal offerings of
works on the internet.25 In France and the United
Kingdom, legislation has been introduced allowing for
the disconnection of internet subscribers from the
internet if and when they have proven to be repeat
offenders.26 Given these developments, the climate
for digital watermarks is not unfavourable. The trend
seems to be to involve more participants in the
enforcement of copyright. HADOPI and the Digital
Economy Act 2010 enlist the cooperation of internet
service providers, who are in the best position to
terminate subscriptions. Likewise, digital watermarks
enlist the help of companies and organizations that
are legitimate users of copyrighted works. At the
same time, there seems to be a trend for individuals
to be less concerned with their privacy, in the sense
that they openly share data about themselves. This
could be interpreted as not unfavourable to the use of
watermarks registering individual persons. In short,
there are many developments and trends that are not
unwelcome to the use of watermarks for copyright
infringement protection purposes.
Nevertheless, content owners and rights holders
have to be careful when considering the introduction
of watermarking schemes. Companies and
organizations making use of licensed works may not
be too enthusiastic about works with identifying
watermarks. This is especially the case if it is not clear
whether ‘leaks’ can be prevented, and the watermark
increases their exposure to liability for breach of
license conditions, or even copyright infringement.
The prevention of leaks may require companies and
organizations to implement costly measures, while
they cannot guarantee that their systems will prevent
intellectual property from being stolen.
If the identity of individual persons is to be
registered, the introduction of a watermark will have
to take place with even more circumspection. The
individual will have to be informed of the presence of
the watermark and the fact that it contains or points
to information that personally identifies him. It is not
certain how the legitimate user of the work will react.
In an ideal scenario, the user of a work internalizes
the idea that his identification data are engrained in
the work, and this knowledge alone will be sufficient
to keep him from sharing the work and spur him on to
take adequate measures to ensure that a work does
not leave their possession unintentionally. The proof
by digital watermark is then no more than a credible
threat that the rights holder need not actually
effectuate.
But users may not be so docile. Users may reject
marked works altogether, and simply not buy them.
They may not want to pay for a legitimate copy of a
work and be responsible if something untoward
happens with their copy. Furthermore, they could
frame their personal dislike in legal arguments that
have wider ramifications. They may feel inhibited in
their freedom to deal with the watermarked works.
Could a picture be shared digitally among members of
a family without fear that one of the family members
puts the picture on the internet? Could a picture be
used in a legal way on the internet without fear that
other internet users copy the picture and make it
available in an illegal way? These consequences are
not elaborated here, but could prove relevant for the
acceptance in society of digital watermarking
technology for copyright enforcement purposes.
But it is not just users refusing to buy watermarked
products. Ignoring watermarks could also be a
problem. If marked works appeared in large numbers
as pirated copies on the internet, it is not known how
right holders might react. Prosecuting some licensees
as an example to others may upset public opinion. It
is risky because it targets the very users of the work
that actually paid for a legal copy. A less threatening
reaction may be to demand better measures to
prevent a leak from occurring again in the future.
Although it is different from making a licensee liable
for (indirect) copyright infringement or breach of
license conditions, it still has its own problems. How
could it be enforced without invading the privacy of
25 A. Gerkens, P. Smeets, F. Teeven and N. van
Vroonhoven-Kok, Auteursrechten, een rapport,
Werkgroep uit de vaste commissies voor Justitie
en voor Economische Zaken in de Tweede Kamer
van de Staten-Generaal, 2010, available at:
http://www.boek9.nl/www.delex-
backoffice.nl/uploads/file/Boek9%20/Andere%2
0stukken/Eindrapport%20parlementaire%20wer
kgroep%20auteursrechten_tcm118-189136.pdf.
26 In France, Loi favorisant la diffusion et la
protection de la création sur Internet (law
promoting the distribution and protection of
creative works on the internet) (HADOPI is the
acronym of the government agency created to
administer the law: Haute Autorité pour la
Diffusion des ?uvres et la Protection des Droits
sur Internet); in the UK, the Digital Economy Act
2010.
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somebody’s home or personal sphere? A tough
approach to enforcement also does not seem to be
viable. In short, the use of digital watermarking in the
sphere of consumers is fraught with difficulties.
Therefore, it is more likely that digital watermarks will
find use in a professional context, at least where it
concerns copyright infringement protection.
Conclusion 
This article assesses how digital watermarks can be
used as evidence in the context of copyright
infringement protection. The legal systems for proof
in civil and criminal cases in the Netherlands basically
allow for the introduction of evidence by digital
watermark. The use of digital watermarks for
copyright infringement protection purposes affects
the privacy of those licensees that can be identified
by the watermark. The identification in relation to the
circumstances in which a marked item of intellectual
property is found provides information about the
licensee: it possibly identifies him as the source of a
‘leak’ and may give away information about the
persons with whom he maintains contacts. However,
the watermark neither gives information about the
circumstances under which the ‘leak’ occurred nor
about the role the registered licensee played in it.
This requires restraint from those interpreting positive
identifications. Deriving information from
identification by watermark is thus a sensitive process
and must take place under adequate privacy
safeguards. Informing the licensee and protocols for
dealing with identification information are important
instruments. Privacy problems can be avoided if only
companies or organizations are registered as
licensees within watermarks.
It is relevant that courts have an adequate
understanding of the scientific aspects of proof by
watermarks. These aspects are both relevant for the
assessment of the evidence as for the viability of
(license) clauses dealing with the evidentiary value
that is to be accorded to digital watermarks.
Information about scientific aspects reaches a court
though an expert witness. However, it is not easy for a
court to assess the knowledge of the witness or the
scientific adequacy of his testimony or report.
Standards and certification can help a court in its
assessment. There exists a standard for the
evaluation of persistent association technologies,
such as watermarks. However, the standard is not
designed for forensic applications, it leaves many
implementation details open and there is no
certification infrastructure in place for benchmarking
tools or experts. Hence, there is room for improving
the support given to courts in assessing watermark
evidence.
Although not strictly a legal issue, the success of
watermarking may also depend on the acceptance by
the people who will be involved in watermarking. In
general, there is a development towards greater
involvement of third persons in the enforcement of
copyrights. This does not mean that those who are
registered in watermarks are prepared to accept
watermarked works. Their position seems to become
weaker when watermarked works start being used. A
positive identification at least morally places them in
a defensive position, where they may be pressed to
provide an explanation for the leak. This may dampen
their willingness to buy works that have watermarks
in place. It is unclear how and to what extent
licensees will use a possible bargaining position they
have to negotiate restrictions upon the use of
watermarks. The introduction of new watermarking
schemes will in this respect require a delicate hand of
rights holders.
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